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This paper deals with a specific aspect of a specific 
probability distribution, namely with changes over 
time in the distribution of macroeconomic growth 
rates, in other words: with the changes in the dis-
tribution of percentage changes in national income. 
The "normal" probability distribution is fully defined 
by two parameters: its mean or first mathematical 
moment and its variance or second moment. At pre-
sent the empirical distribution of national income 
percentage changes actually differs slightly from 
a "normal" distribution, in three ways: (1) its third 
and central mathematical moment, i.e. the expected 
value of the third power of the random variable in 
question, is not quite zero, the distribution being 
"flatter" than normal; (2) it is not quite symmetrical 
in change, upward changes being on average slightly 
bigger than downward ones; (3) and above all, pro-
bability distributions shift over time in their means 
and even more so in their variances. The last point is 
especially controversial: In 1953, Milton Friedman1 
explicitly declared that the mean – he ignored the va-
riance – of the probability distribution of logarithmic 
income changes had been constant over time since 
the Industrial Revolution, a statement difficult to dis-
prove empirically, because the English data from the 
225 years since about 1790 have been too few to dis- 
 
1 Milton Friedman, "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates" 
in M.Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics, Chicago and 
London 1953, 157–203. Especially in IIA3, "Speculation 
in foreign exchange markets will be stabilizing", Friedman 
argues the exact opposite of that caption.
prove Friedman once for all.  On the whole, constant 
probability distributions over time would be more 
typical for many phenomena in the natural sciences. 
At the end of March 1968, I focussed my inaugural 
lecture in Vienna on the question of the significance 
of looking on the one hand at the mean and on the 
other on the variance measures of economic data.2  A 
didactic simplification was my statement that eco-
nomic analysis was (only) looking at mean values of 
economic growth while statistical analysis tended to 
look (mainly) at variances –  especially at the vari-
ance in economic growth rates, both over time and, 
actually closely related, between growth rates of dif-
ferent economic indicators and over different places. 
As to differences of mean rates of growth over time I 
pointed out that in Austria these differences (and the 
deeper reasons for them) were quite distinct for the 
1940s, the booming 1950s and the already declining 
1960s. In contrast to Friedman, I spoke about chan-
ging probability distributions of growth over time.
The variance of economic growth rates seemed to be 
increasing then, especially in the difficult late 1960s. 
Remember I was speaking just before a then immi-
nent political economy crash, especially a crash of 
academic life, which began in May 68 in France. 
2 Erich W. Streissler, "Structural Economic Thought – On the 
Significance of the Austrian School Today (Inaugural Lecture 
Part I), Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 29, 1969, 237–266; 
"A Stochastic Model of International Reserve Requirements 
During Growth of World Trade (Inaugural Lecture Part II), 
Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 29, 1969, 347–370.  
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II
The contrasts between mean economic development 
and its variances both over time and space have been 
of central importance in recent years – worldwide. 
Their driving force, American investment activi-
ties since the year 2000, in particular that of banks, 
peaked just before the crash of early autumn 2008, 
on some measures the greatest economic crash ever.3 
After the secular boom years 1995–1998 economic 
growth started to dwindle, even to stall, from 2000 
onwards. I pointed this out already at a conference of 
the Austrian National Bank in 2001,4 only to be vehe-
mently contradicted by a US-American lady econo-
mist present. It was the political hope of the USA that 
a sharp decline of growth rates could be prevented. 
The central feature, however, was that the economic 
growth rate in the USA turned markedly down while 
at the same time the variance of sectoral growth went 
up considerably – once more the feature of change 
in both mean and variance of growth simultaneous-
ly. But it is just this increase in variance that makes 
it particularly difficult to see any decrease in growth 
and, above all, to perceive the precise amount of the 
decline.
The level of banking activities had about doubled 
since the 1990s, especially in the USA but also in 
Great Britain (and Ireland). Again and again, up till 
now (the 15th year of decline!) standard bank propa-
ganda has tried to persuade the public that financial 
returns are good, if not increasing, snatching at the 
few moments of temporarily higher rates of return 
for advertising effects. Remember: economic growth 
measurements are very uncertain at the best of times! 
Such moments of seemingly higher returns do occur 
because of a greater temporal variance of the rates of 
return. Bank propaganda to buy financial assets was 
focussed – erroneously – especially on equities alt-
hough, in fact, longer-term averages of rates of return 
had declined most. But the sale of equities would 
earn the banks the highest fees, relative to their other 
business.
 
3 See a statement of Ben Bernanke, discussed in detail in 
section VI of this paper. 
4  E.W.Streissler, "Financial Institutions and Technological 
Progress: An Historical Perspective", Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank, Volkswirtschaftliche Tagung 2001, 2–10. See 
also "The Financial Market Crisis", Lecture, Gesamtsitzung 
der ÖAW, January 17, 2009.
III
The confusion between actually only short-term and 
only apparently high rates of economic return of fi-
nancial institutions (like banks) and the secularly 
declining average rates of economic growth and con-
sequently falling real rates of return is not unusual in 
periods of sharply declining economic development. 
In fact, it is typical of turning points of economic 
growth rates. It had been a feature of the immedia-
te post-Napoleonic era in Europe and once more in 
Vienna of the crash of May 1873, when a seemingly 
soaring development during a world trade fair tur-
ned into secular depression almost over night, appro-
priately marked by a frightening outbreak of cholera. 
The most immediate and relevant example of such 
a significant turning point in development was, of 
course, the "Great Crash" in the USA from October 
1929 to spring 1933. The significant difference to the 
present was that this time the switch "point" in deve-
lopment was very much extended in time by both fis-
cal and above all monetary activism in the USA due 
in particular to the politically motivated initiatives of 
the governor of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan 
– an extension which, of course, made the eventual 
crash only greater. 
In the last quarter of the 20th century the size of the 
banking sector both in the USA and Britain had 
about doubled; but especially in the US very little in-
novatory manufacturing seemed to be left. The US 
banking industry simply refused to admit that any 
significant change in growth rates was taking place. 
Over the past 25 years, in the USA any longer term 
income growth was concentrated in the top fifth of 
the income distribution, especially in the top 1%, 
while average and below average incomes actually 
declined. The income distribution of the USA has 
become ever more unequal.5 The top tenth comprises 
mainly banking incomes, of course, and so the poli-
tical denial of decline is an upper class phenomenon, 
particularly evident among Republicans.
"America's material standard of living continues [!] to 
improve",6 Alan Greenspan wrote at a time (late 2007) 
when correctly calculated it was already noticeably 
declining for most Americans. In mid-October 1996 
5 The increasing variance of growth  rates of individual inco-
mes in the USA will be discussed in section VII below. 
6 Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence – Adventures in a 
New World, London and New York 2007, 181.  (To be quoted 
as Greenspan 2007.) 
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Greenspan coined the term "irrational exuberance":7 
It was typical of top income earners and due to the 
(positive) effects of inflation on financial asset values 
and thus of inflationary improvements even of real 
wealth. Remember: Inflationary income and wealth 
increases are real for those rich enough to spend 
only a very small part of their current income on 
consumption. Greenspan, the outstanding US cen-
tral bank governor (governor for more than 18 ye-
ars: from the summer of 1987 till very early 2006) 
was  decisive in boosting the erroneous US belief in 
continuous "improvement". More and more, he tur-
ned from calling exuberance "irrational" to actually 
himself stimulating this exuberance, both for politi-
cal reasons and from a personal optimism due to a 
belated joyful marriage. His autobiography of 2007, 
written at the age of 81, is subtitled "adventures in a 
new world".
IV
What were the preconditions of the 21st century de-
veloped world, in particular of US development du-
ring the decade of the 1990s, if not already the two 
decades of the 1980s and the 1990s? Centred on the 
years 1994–1999 the integrated developed economies 
experienced their fifth Kondratieff boom since about 
1785. In 1939, in a weighty publication8 on business 
cycles of various lengths Joseph Schumpeter named 
the longest cycles (of 40 and more years) after their 
Russian discoverer, the statistician Kondratieff. Kon-
dratieff booms are concentrations in time of major 
innovations in the course of historical development, 
such booms of several years' length typically being 
followed by long recessionary periods, as now during 
the first and second decade of the 21st century.
While the first Kondratieff boom in Britain after 1785 
centred on two industries, cotton goods and steel 
production, and later booms on a variety of indus-
tries, the boom of 1994 to 1999 was unusually nar-
rowly based, centring on one industry only, viz. on 
computer hard and soft ware. Furthermore, while in 
earlier times these leading boom industries had typi-
cally employed so-called capital using technologies, 
e.g. railway construction during the second Kondra-
tieff of the mid 19th century, now the computer in-
dustry was typical of the opposite development: This 
7 Greenspan 2007, 176.  
8 Joseph Schumpeter, Business Cycles. A Theoretical, Historical 
and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, 2 vols., 1939.  
industry was strongly capital saving. Therefore there 
was no long-term follow-up of investment due to 
longer time higher returns for computer production 
or computer using firms. Not the innovative produ-
cers themselves profited largely, but much rather the 
final consumers, in terms of much reduced compu-
ter prices. The boom was therefore unusually short. 
Already in 2000 we witnessed the first computer in-
dustry crash in the so-called dot-com crisis, with the 
spectacular crash of Enron in December of that year. 
This rapid change from particularly high economic 
growth rates to very low, or soon negative, growth 
rates – and that with an increasing variance of diffe-
rent growth rates – made for a substantial problem of 
general understanding, especially of fast understan-
ding by the banks financing those developments. A 
recent issue of The Economist drily states what hap-
pens again and again: "It took barely a month for the 
bubble of optimism that formed … at the start of the 
year to subside".9
The difficulties of understanding were aggravated by 
the fact that the boom of the latter 1990s had been 
also inflationary, to a considerable extent, making 
for especially high nominal rates of return, while the 
first and second decade of the 21st century showed 
rapidly dwindling rates of inflation, and in a number 
of countries, particularly in Europe and Japan, even 
declining price levels. The booming late 1990s were 
followed by an ever more recessionary first decade 
of the 21st century. The rapidly worsening investment 
climate created a false optimism not only on the part 
of those banks that were directly financing indust-
rial innovations, but also of banks that did so only 
indirectly.  
V
Let us turn to a specific feature of US-American de-
velopment: namely to the behaviour of the average 
American private saver, who felt himself stimulated 
by expansive public policy decisions and in particu-
lar by the economic policy of Alan Greenspan from 
2001 onwards.
The average American saver looked less and less at his 
income as the determinant of his savings, but rather 
at his wealth. And wealth in the USA increasingly 
meant average stock prices. This was due to the fact 
that in the last quarter of the 20th century the share of 
9 The Economist, February 15, 2014, 59.
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stock-owners in the population went up from about 
one third to fully two thirds, thus making stock ow-
nership more or less the rule rather than the excep-
tion. As Allen and Gale noted in an important 1994 
article:10 For the average investor, holding on average 
only different shares or share indices, share owner-
ship was not at all diversified, but often it included 
artificially created financial media tracking the mo-
vement of averages of share prices (index accounts). 
Once more it was Greenspan who, during his long 
tenure at the Fed, had also switched orientation of 
the Fed's policy more and more away from incomes 
and towards stock market asset values. From 1994 to 
1999 stock prices first went up due to the fifth Kond-
ratieff boom in rising incomes that raised stock mar-
ket prices on average by a factor of three. Then, from 
2003 to 2007, they soared because of the increasing 
asset price effect of falling interest rates. Thus, the 
average American had felt himself first richer due to 
a stock market boom and then due to the positive 
asset price effect of falling interest rates – which en-
tailed rising house prices. Secularly falling interest 
rates often "materialized" as rising asset values.
Compared with Germany and Austria whose savings 
rates were around 10% of GDP, US American savings 
rates were unusual as they progressively fell to close 
to zero. In 2005–2007, the rate of private personal sa-
vings actually fell to –2%. Americans believed that 
rising nominal asset prices – first in terms of stock 
prices and then in terms of house prices – spelled a 
sufficient increase in wealth, without additional real 
savings being needed. And also, since the Regan ad-
ministration, Americans have tended to believe that 
rising current account deficits do not matter: The 
whole world would gladly continue to lend to the 
USA. Or, as once more Alan Greenspan said, quite 
in contrast to what would hold in Europe: "The cur-
rent account deficit is the least of my cares". He only 
thought about "long-term growth and employment"11 
and rarely looked at long-term interest rates and ne-
ver at the current account. On March 29, 200812  the 
US current account deficit reached 739 billion dollar 
or 4.7% of the GDP and the trade deficit 819 billion. 
Having shrunk only a little in the 2008–2009 depres-
10 Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, "Limited Market Participa-
tion and Volatility of Asset Prices", American Economic 
Review 84/4, 1994, 933–955.
11 Greenspan 2007, 110.
12 The Economist of that date.
sion, the current account deficit still stood at 399 bil-
lion in mid-February 2014,13 and the increase in debt 
was larger than the growth in US incomes.
VI
Obviously all this had to do with US monetary policy, 
especially that of Greenspan. Actually it had alrea-
dy been Clinton, president from 1993 to 2001, who 
had decided to make a political effort to get as many 
Americans as possible to be owners of their homes. 
This campaign was continued under Bush II. In es-
sence it meant getting US banks to lend to new home 
buyers most or even all of the purchase price, soon 
asking initial mortgagees to contribute on purchase 
no more than 3% and finally, around 2005, to con-
tribute in fact zero of the purchase price! "By 2006, 
nearly 69% of households owned their own home, up 
from 64% in 1994 and 44% in 1940".14  On the whole, 
stimulating the economy by huge government and 
government-guaranteed private debt was the tradi-
tional remedy when the real economic boom of the 
fifth Kondratieff petered off at the turn of the mille-
nium. The price increase in houses eventually turned 
into a price fall, but the banks still believed – wron-
gly now – that they could lend well over 100% of the 
purchase prices of houses. 
For the Republican Greenspan, stimulation was also 
to a large extent politically motivated: After the De-
mocratic Clinton administration at last a Republican 
was elected president, G.W. Bush. Most unfortuna-
tely, however, two months after his taking office a 
major recession began in the USA in March 2001. It 
had been predated by the computer industry recessi-
on of the "dot.com crash" of the year before. In 2001 
Greenspan stimulated as much as he could: He lowe-
red the Federal Reserve short term interest rate from 
6.5% to 1.75% already during 2001 and later, from 
2002 to 2004, to only 1% – an interest level low last 
reached in the 1950s. (After the crash of 2008 this 
policy of extremely low short-term interest rates was 
continued, even more markedly, by Greenspan's suc-
cessor, Ben Bernanke, who set the short-term inte-
rest rate at next to zero, viz. to 0.2–0.25%. There the 
Fed rate still stands, even today (March 2014).
The 9/11 attack on New York and Washington was a 
sort of windfall for Bush II, a president oriented more 
13 The Economist, February 15, 2014.
14 Greenspan 2007, 230.
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towards fiscal policy: American citizens, already 
then very low savers, rallied to the President's appeal 
that higher private personal spending was a patriotic 
duty, and the recession (in the US sense of falling 
national income) ended after only eight months, by 
November 2001. As Greenspan proudly relates,15 this 
together with government tax cuts brought Bush II 
an approval rate of 86% in late autumn of 2001.
The stimulating effect of a highly expansive fiscal 
policy together with Greenspan's policy of very low 
interest rates assured the re-election of Bush in 2004. 
Before the excesses of overstimulation of the US eco-
nomy became evident in 2007 and 2008, Greenspan 
resigned as governor of the Federal Reserve at the 
end of January 2006, two and a half years before his 
appointment would have run out (viz. in mid-2008). 
He resigned with the specious argument that he was 
about to turn eighty. Considering that the economy 
was then still running smoothly, one wonders if the 
great policy optimist Greenspan was then following 
his own prescription in his quasi-valedictory paper 
of 2004: namely that, in policy decisions, one should 
always take into account the small probability of an 
alternatively very bad outcome of one's policy as 
well.16
VII
The early 21st century was the first time since the im-
mediate post-war era that economic development 
was characterized by huge variances: the variance of 
investment shares relative to GDP, the variance of sa-
vings shares, similarly defined, and most interestin-
gly the variance of the difference between investment 
and saving shares – or, what is by definition the same 
thing, the difference of export and import shares in 
GDP. 
At the height of the US housing boom the variance 
of current accounts stood at a maximum.17 The US 
current account deficit stood at 4.7% of GDP, sur-
passed in relative deficits only by Greece (–12.0%), 
Spain (–9.1), South Africa (–8.0), Turkey (–7.7), Pa-
kistan (–7.0) and a little bit by Australia (–5.6) and 
Brazil (–4.9). On the other hand, current account 
surpluses above 10% of GDP were achieved by Sin-
15 Greenspan 2007, 6.
16 Alan Greenspan, "Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary Policy", 
American Economic Review, PP, 94/2, 2004, 33–40.
17 The Economist, March 29, 2008. 
gapore (23.5%), Saudi Arabia (22.8), Norway (15.8), 
Switzerland (14.6), Malaysia (13.9), and China (10.4). 
In absolute terms, the US current account deficit of 
gigantic 739.6 billion was nearly exactly financed to 
about one third each by the surpluses of Germany 
and Austria (267.6 billion), of China (249.9 billion) 
and of Japan (214.7 billion). 
At the nadir of the recession around mid-2010 nearly 
all the figures had shrunk so that the variance had 
declined sharply, though, in historical comparison, it 
was still very large. The US current account deficit 
had nearly halved to 391.9 billion or only –3.1% of 
GDP,18 while China's surplus, absolutely somewhat 
larger and relatively to the US twice its former level, 
stood at more than 70% of the US deficit at 282.2 
billion, then only 4.2% of Chinese GDP. With 191.3 
billion Germany and Austria were financing about 
40% of the US current account deficit. No current 
account deficit stood at 7% or more of GDP, while 
in the 2008 statistics five countries had exceeded that 
level. The relative current account surpluses had also 
nearly halved, Norway standing – exceptionally – re-
latively a little higher at 16.3%, while Singapore had 
14.1%, Malaysia 13.3%, and Saudi Arabia 12.2% of 
their GDPs as surpluses. All other positive current 
account balances remained well below 10% of their 
GDP levels.
If we now switch to the present,19 the variance of 
current account balances is once more substantially 
smaller, although still historically high. Contrary to 
the present celebratory mood in the USA, the US 
current account deficit is at 398.7 billion absolutely 
about as high as 2010, but relatively now only –2.4% 
of GDP. In the periods in between, the deficit in 
current account figures usually had been even hig-
her than around 450 billion. China is still financing 
nearly one half of the US deficit, 388.6 billion, which 
now equals only 1.9% of its own GDP. At 276.2 bil-
lion Germany plus Austria had greatly increased fi-
nancing foreign both in absolute and relative terms, 
financing nearly 70% of the US current account 
deficit, the same percentage as China in 2010. Both 
current account surpluses and deficits tended to 
be smaller in relative terms. But four northern and 
central European countries outside the EU together 
financed as much as China: Denmark, Norway, Swe-
den, and Switzerland had a current account surplus 
18 The Economist, August 14, 2010. 
19 Figures are from The Economist of February 15, 2014.
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of together 199.1 billion. Five countries achieved a 
relative current account surplus larger than 10% of 
GDP: Singapore +20.4%, Saudi Arabia +18.0, Nor-
way +12.8, Switzerland +11.8 and Taiwan, which 
had increased its surplus to +10.8%. More than 6% 
deficits in the current account only occur twice, for 
South Africa –6.6% and the relatively largest deficit 
for Turkey at –7.5%. 
The USA showed a current account deficit in 32 out 
of the 33 years from 1982 to 2014. The sole excepti-
on was 1991, when the US fought Iraq with so many 
allies that those allies largely financed the war; thus 
the USA came out of it with a positive current ac-
count. Usually it was the US federal budget that was 
in a huge deficit, but also, and progressively so, the 
failing of US private personal savings, which reached 
an exceptional –2% of GDP in 2005–2007. In the last 
years of the Clinton administration the exceptional 
happened: From 1998 to a maximum in Clinton's last 
year, 2000, there was no longer any government bud-
get deficit, and the still remaining current account 
deficit was due only to the shortfall of private savings 
relative to the then still relatively high investments. 
After the default of Lehman Brothers on September 
15, 2008, government deficits as the causes of current 
account deficits exploded. In the last years of Bush II 
and above all in Obama's first presidential term the 
US budget deficit rapidly doubled government debt 
– to Portuguese levels of about 112% of GDP. So far 
there is no sign that US budgetary indebtedness will 
shrink. The USA seem to be unaware that increasing 
international indebtedness is dangerous. 
VIII
Worldwide, the financial crash of 2008 was the lar-
gest ever, in absolute and possibly even in relative 
terms. And it was, as in 1929–1933, largely a US affair, 
but with strong reverberations in Europe and even 
in the emerging economies. This time it was Europe, 
particularly the largest European banks that above all 
financed US excesses. In 1929 to 1933, already before 
the peak of the boom, the USA had withdrawn finan-
ces from Europe due to the then high returns on their 
own stock market.
After 2001, the first signs of serious financial difficul-
ties showed up in mid-2007, and March 2008 wit-
nessed the first failure of an important US financial 
firm, Bear Sterns. Upon government intervention 
and with considerable financial help by the govern-
ment Bear Sterns was bought by several other large 
banks. This led to the erroneous belief that the US 
government would always lend a helping hand to big 
firms in financial difficulties. 
In early September 2008, the two governmental 
mortgage guaranteeing agencies (then actually pri-
vately owned) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had to 
be bailed out by the government at a seriously high 
level. The central financial problem was that, driven 
by government, US banks had lent more and more 
recklessly to poorer and poorer private individuals. 
They had lent in terms of mortgages, from which, 
however, the sales agents were the only ones who 
profited:  In many cases, buyers of private houses did 
not even pay back the first instalment of their mort-
gage and as they did not have to make any down pay-
ment on purchase, house price inclusive of all sales 
fees being credited, penniless buyers could actually 
just live about one year in their newly bought house 
for free before being evicted, in the end having paid 
nothing at all. For by US law contrary to European 
law, US debtors only lose their mortgaged property, 
but nothing else. 
In the very last years of that government-stimulated 
boom house prices had started to rise markedly, al-
together by about 25%. (Similar and even higher in-
creases occurred in Europe, though very little in Ger-
many and Austria.) On a mortgage including sales 
fee therefore typical house values eventually lost up 
to 50%, as house prices soon dropped to about two 
thirds of their normal level, and even more relative to 
their inflated sales values including sales agents' fees. 
About half of the banks' losses were due to such fool-
hardy mortgages, the other half to losses on compli-
cated (non-transparent) financial contracts.  Green-
span estimated that the entire world lost about $40 
"trillion" US dollars on illusory house prices and the 
USA $17 "trillion" or about 120% of GDP. But asset 
prices fluctuate much more over time than incomes. 
So it is possible that optimistic US estimations can 
figure the losses at substantially less, i.e. at 40 or 50%.
On Monday, September 15, 2008, at 1:45 a.m., the 
decisive crash occurred when Lehman Brothers, the 
fifth largest US financial firm had to announce its 
bankruptcy. The US government had first tried to 
get South Korea to help Lehman Brothers, but to no 
avail. Then the huge British bank, Barclays, had been 
approached. Barclays was more or less willing to step 
in, but was strictly forbidden to do so by the British 
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Chancellor of the Exchequer, Darling, who argued 
that it was likely to take decades for Barclays' to be 
paid back. The popular song "Do not forsake me, oh 
my darling" acquired new connotations then! Dar-
ling simply said No. Thus, the time-honoured tenet 
that the largest financial companies were too impor-
tant and too large to fail was proved wrong: Lehman 
Brothers was too large not to fail, too large to be sa-
ved by the US government.
The shock in the USA was enormous. Now, where 
was a financial firm that was not in danger? So that 
when on the next day, September 16, the only slightly 
smaller insurance company, AIG, was on the point 
of failure, government did step in, giving guarantees 
even to all stock holders and not only to the credi-
tors of AIG. It could be argued that after the Leh-
man Brothers failure such government action was 
necessary to calm the markets, especially the foreign 
markets, as AIG was financed to more than half by 
foreigners. What was not remarked upon, however, 
not even in the text of the important financial report 
of a bipartisan commission of the US Senate20 was 
this: The largest shareholder in AIG, holding 14% or 
nominally $1.1 billion, was Goldman Sachs; and the 
casting voice in that decision was that of the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, Nick Paulsen, who happened to 
be a former partner of Goldman Sachs. The same was 
true of the head of the New York stock exchange, Tim 
Geithner, who was to succeed Paulsen as Secretary of 
the Treasury under the next President. So Goldman 
Sachs was saved by the fortunate coincidence that the 
financial branch of the government was in the hands 
of former Goldman Sachs partners. – At present, 
Goldman Sachs, with around 11% annual return on 
its capital, is once more the best earner among the 
big banks.21
In what followed, the US government helped, each 
time in different ways, one big financial firm af-
ter another. The biggest bank, Citibank, was largely 
nationalized in 2009. By now, however, most of the 
financial firms that had been assisted by huge sums 
of public money (remember the vast fiscal indebted-
ness entailed), especially under the Obama adminis-
tration and under Geithner, can stand on their own 
feet again.
20 The Financial Crisis Report to the US Senate by 10 Senators 
(6 Democrats, 4 Republicans), published in January 2011 ( a 
mimeographed volume of more than 600 pages).      
21 The Economist, February 19, 2014, 62.
IX
Speaking of public money or public assistance, I must 
point out a serious ethical problem: Public money is 
the sovereign's money. The problem is at least 2000 
years old, going back to the times of the first integra-
ted world empire, the Roman empire. Should public 
finance both cost and serve the sovereign or rather a 
special interest group? This question was put to Jesus 
by the Pharisees – a special interest group interested 
in public finance only in so far as it would furnish 
the Temple. Taking the Roman tax coin, the denarius, 
as evidence, Jesus answered: "Pay Caesar what be-
longs to Caesar – and God what belongs to God" (Mt 
22,15–22, Mk12,13–17, Lk 20, 20–26). God not being 
considered financially relevant, "Caesar" was the so-
vereign. In a democracy the sovereign is the general 
public or in financial terms the average taxpayer. He 
or she should be the focus of all financial decisions.
But that was not what the US Secretary of the Treasu-
ry, Tim Geithner, under Obama considered relevant. 
For the USA he took only a much smaller group with 
very special interests to be relevant: Every aspect of 
crisis resolution was to be geared to the interest of 
the financial community; or to put it in everyday 
language: geared to the special interest of banks and 
bank owners. From 2008 to 2014, the USA financed 
bankers mainly out of public funds. Similarly in Eu-
rope, particularly in Spain, the debts of large banks 
and their owners had to be financed by the general 
public. 
X
The most important difference between development 
forecasts in the natural sciences, where the natural 
phenomena examined have no "voice", and the actors 
in finance and monetary economics is the large num-
ber of self-declared "experts". In many cases, these 
"experts" have a personal interest in the effect of their 
development forecasts. They are highly interested in 
an economically "good" outcome of development be-
cause that means that their asset prices will go up and 
they become richer. US Americans who are domina-
ted by their banks more than people in other econo-
mies, tend most strongly to overestimate the returns 
to their financial development and perhaps also to 
underestimate the rate of development of other eco-
nomies. Alan Greenspan's biography is a fascinating 
example of such US American self-deception. Even 
after the great depression of 2008–2009 the standard 
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US longer time view remained astonishingly bullish 
in spite of the fact that not before 2013 did US nati-
onal income just regain its 2008 level: What was in 
effect zero or negative economic growth was consi-
dered a "good" development.
This bullishness has much to do with the fact that the 
US income distribution is the most unequal one of all 
nations22 and is progressively becoming even more 
unequal. Within the last 30 years, only agents in the 
top 20% of the income distribution have registered 
any gains in real income, while already the median 
earner has lost some 2 to 3% in real income and ear-
ners in the echelons lower down have lost even more. 
On the other hand, young entrants into jobs in ban-
king and finance are enviously reported to receive up 
to three times the initial salaries of jobholders in the 
"real" economy. Of course, US overvaluing optimism 
is partly due to the fact that the richest US income 
earners, those who also matter politically most, have 
been doing relatively best. Among US Republicans, 
above all white males, there is a considerable number 
who would even deny that there actually ever was a 
recession in America. They tend to think an assumed 
recession is part of an official economic "miscalcu-
lation".
Whether the Great Depression of 1929–1933 or the 
already too apologetically named "Great Recession" 
of 2007–2009 was the greater world event is perhaps 
debatable. Ben Bernanke, Greenspan's recently reti-
red successor as Governor of the Fed (2006–2014) is 
on record as considering the present depression the 
economically greater one. The US 1929–33 depres-
sion caused the general price level to drop by some 
22%, while recently the deflationary effects were 
smaller and at most only temporary, but the break-
down in the by now much more important and larger 
financial markets was far more devastating. In other 
words: 1929–1933 was larger in "real" terms, 2007–
2009 was financially more serious.
This is also due to the fact that now the countervai-
ling financial activities of the Federal Reserve and 
all other central banks of the developed world were 
much more extensive and intensive: What was new 
is that central bank interest rates everywhere in the 
developed world were dropped to some 0.2–0.75% 
a year and have been kept there until now, i.e. by 
22 Anthony R.Atkinson, Th.Pickety and E. Saez, "Top Incomes 
in the Long Run of History", Journal of Economic Literature 
49/1, 2011, 3–71. 
now for the sixth year, with only the slightest signs 
anywhere of an "incipient end" to this hyperactivity. 
What has been true for the USA has in many ways 
been true also for the rest of the developing world 
and for East Asia, but in the opposite direction, this 
rest of the world being fully complementary to the 
USA.
So far, attempts at creating an upswing of the real 
economy have not been successful, apart from re-
peated periods of a very few hopeful months each. 
Worldwide, the common effect of stimuli in the fi-
nancial sphere is a huge excess of intended savings 
over real investment opportunities; at best govern-
ments run up more debt  and use the funds dome-
stically, i.e. with an income multiplier of at most one, 
though often smaller: The multiplier in the USA of 
around one is among the largest. In contrast Germa-
ny was forced – illegally – by the now governor of the 
European Central Bank, Mario Draghi (once upon 
a time also at Goldman Sachs') to hand out, without 
interest, most of its current account surplus of 6.6% 
of GDP to other European economies. In fact: Ger-
many is handing a huge gift to the recipients of such 
"loans". Germany' true GDP is, of course, reduced, by 
that amount! 
XI
The crash of 2007–2009 can be seen as a change-of-
variance phenomenon: it has changed the variance 
of economic development, i.e. of the growth of na-
tional product.  Since 2000, average rates of econo-
mic growth everywhere had already tended to de-
cline relative to the fifth Kondratieff boom years of 
1994–1999. Greenspan comments:23 "Annual growth 
of non-farm business output per hour has averaged 
close to 2.2% since [1870] … Output per hour, … af-
ter the large surge in growth … peaked at 4% … and 
slipped to a 1% rate by the first quarter of 2007", i.e. 
already before the crash. Since 2007–2009 we have 
witnessed not only a further decline in average 
growth, but also at first a jump up and then a some-
what lesser increase in the variance of growth rates, 
especially taken over different countries at the same 
time, but also (to a lesser degree) a variance increase 
of averages of growth rates over time.
Similar problems of variance changes occur also in 
other quantitative sciences, of course. In microe-
23 Greenspan 2007, 471. 
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conomics, in contrast to the macroeconomics of 
financial markets, a variance problem was attacked 
much earlier, in the first analysis of quantitatively 
incomplete information. In 1961, George Stigler, in 
an article that was eventually to earn him a Nobel 
Prize,24 was the first to analyse the question how to 
find the best, and that is, given the quality, the lowest 
price for a commodity to be bought. Finding the lo-
west price within a distribution of sample prices is 
a variance problem. Stigler suggested that given the 
cost functions of sampling prices and, on the other 
hand, a basic distribution of prices you have to find 
the optimal figure in the sample of price claims to be 
examined. The optimum in this search for the lowest 
price to be paid is found when the marginal cost of 
further sampling is at most as high as the expected 
difference between the relatively lowest price found 
and the actual lowest price possible. The sampling 
procedure suggested assumes, however, that you 
can get price information only from the whole price 
sample drawn; e.g. how many costly queries do you 
have to send out if you hope to receive all the answers 
back at nearly the same time. In this case given the 
price and cost distributions the optimum number of 
queries to be sent out is fully determinate. But if you 
receive an answer each time you ask for a selling pri-
ce, the optimum search procedure is different: You 
have to fix in advance an acceptance price, a price 
when to buy without searching further. In this case 
the number of search steps is not given, but is itself 
determined by a probability distribution: A search 
can take a short time or be lengthy, possibly – with 
a tiny chance – even reaching infinity. Even for these 
slightly different cases of optimal search the search 
procedures are thus already different; and nothing 
at all is as yet said about how to find the underlying 
price distribution, so that optimum price search is 
already a highly complex phenomenon. 
In some periods of pictorial art, there is what one 
might call a surfeit of "great" painters, while at other 
times there are very few top artists – again a variance 
phenomenon. In some natural sciences another type 
of variance phenomenon has become central. Im-
portant investigations in physics show path-breaking 
interest in phenomena as close as possible to near 
absolute zero temperatures or, on the other hand, at 
extremely high temperatures. Looking at extremes in 
24 His Nobel prize winning article is G.J. Stigler, "The Econom-
ics of Information", Journal of Political Economy 69, 1961, 
213–225, 
these ways is once more a way of looking at variance 
phenomena of our world.
XII
The increasing heterogeneity and complexity of ma-
croeconomic financial positions is to a large extent 
the cause of widespread misjudgement of US financi-
al problems. In Greenspan's view financial "markets 
have become too huge, complex and fast-moving 
to be subject to twentieth-century supervision and 
regulation".25 But that financial markets are now "too 
huge" is not the relevant point. Not the absolute size 
of international financial markets is relevant, but 
rather that part of them that is not rapidly self-equili-
brating in times of crisis.  In 1970, the Nobel Laurea-
te Eugene Fama presented a basic model26 of varying 
self-equilibrating mechanisms of markets, and in 
2007 Greenspan held that "market failure is the rare 
exception"27 and that "regulation, by its nature, inhi-
bits freedom of market action, and that freedom to 
act expeditiously is what rebalances markets".28 With 
these remarks, Greenspan only showed the usual 
American optimism about market behaviour before 
the crash of 2008. Unfortunately, market failure has 
proved to be not at all "rare". Since 2008, we have 
known that Lehman Brothers was a banking firm too 
large to be financially saved, that regulation can be 
too costly to be effected or, on the other hand, that 
regulation may even increase the costs of a finan-
cial crisis. At times important groups show market 
destabilizing behaviour and that for considerable 
periods of time. "Value is what people perceive it to 
be", says Greenspan.29 But in turbulent times such 
perceptions may easily be wrong and, on the other 
hand, the opportunities for rapidly shifting finance 
much too large. "Between the end of 2001 and March 
2007 [Greenspan's last date is "June 2007"] China and 
Japan combined accumulated $1.5 trillion of foreign 
exchange, of which four-fifths appears to be in dollar 
claims."30 Thus the value of the US dollar basically de-
pends only on the policy of two countries (or, adding 
25 Greenspan 2007, 489.  
26 Eugene F. Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of 
Theory and Empirical Work", Journal of Finance 25/2, 1970, 
383–417. 
27 Greenspan 2007, 492.
28 Greenspan 2007, 489. 
29 Greenspan 2007, 486.
30 Greenspan 2007, 486.
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Germany, on three); and that they hold four fifths 
of their funds in dollars is actually a much higher 
share than that of the dollar among world currencies 
held. Even $1.5 "trillion", however, is a tiny share of 
worldwide funds. Of these, Greenspan says: "Aggre-
gate holdings of foreign exchange by central banks 
and world private-sector portfolios of foreign cross-
border liquid assets approached $50 "trillion" in early 
2007, according to the BIS and the IMF."31 $50 "trilli-
on" are more than thirty times the already huge $1.5 
trillion quoted above. Shifts in a very few big coun-
tries' willingness to hold such funds or, on the other 
hand, a possible stampede of relatively few holders of 
"private-sector portfolios" may cause huge exchange 
rate movements. The stability of the value of the US 
dollar is dangerously dependent on the "good beha-
viour" of governments, on the one hand, and of pri-
vate speculators, on the other. 
"[U]nwinding of our current account deficit is not 
likely to have a major impact on economic activity 
or employment", wrote Greenspan in 2007; and "mo-
netary policy can simulate the gold standard stable 
prices".32  Both of these highly optimistic evaluations 
are historically obviously false. As to stable prices un-
der the gold standard: From 1929 till early 1933 the 
US price level fell by a full 22%, still under the gold 
standard. But uniquely in world history from 1945–
1953 the price level of the USA doubled without low 
nominal interest rates changing, which, as never be-
fore in history after a major war, reduced the share of 
US government debt in GDP by one half. In the more 
than five years after the autumn of 2008 US mone-
tary policy has been highly expansionary and yet 
the price level hardly rose. The US current account 
in absolute dollar terms about halved, but it was 
not "unwound". Another evidently wrong forecast 
by Greenspan is the following: "CPI inflation rates 
by 2030 will be some 41/2% higher"33  (when, in fact, 
there will be hardly any inflation and therefore hard-
ly any rise). A nominally halved but still gigantic US 
current account deficit has had no discernible effect 
on "economic activity or employment". Nor did near 
zero short-term Federal Reserve interest rates have a 
noticeable effect on the real economy. Altogether af-
ter the crash of September 2008, but quite contrary to 
Greenspan's standard line of thinking, real economic 
31 Greenspan 2007, 487, note.
32 Greenspan 2007, both quotations 491.
33 Greenspan 2007, 483.   
development seems in large part to have been decou-
pled from nominal economic changes.
There is potential here for serious conflicts of interest. 
The palpable impossibility of continued US current 
account deficit accumulation is clear, by all historical 
experience. However, in the last five years US govern-
ment indebtedness has about doubled to some 112% 
of GDP – which is the level of Portugal! – without 
there being visible any tendencies or seeming desire 
to lower it. Since 2000 and even more markedly since 
2008, there has been an obvious divergence between 
different nations in their positive or negative current 
account positions or, in other words, in their pro-
babilities of tending to become ever more debtor or 
ever more international creditor nations. This has 
already been touched upon in section VII. But there 
is also a mounting potential conflict within nations 
and that particularly strongly within the USA. There 
is a dynamic of conflict due to the mounting income 
inequality: the richest Americans becoming ever ri-
cher on average and the lower half of the US income 
distribution having lost in real incomes over the last 
30 years.
Thus, income distribution has rapidly become more 
unequal. The Gini coefficient of income inequality 
"rose steadily between 1980 and 2005 from .403 to 
.469".34 Since 2008 "95% of the gains of the recove-
ry have flowed to the richest 1% of households".35 In 
fact, the top 1% of US income earners receives no 
less than 18% of all incomes and, what is even more 
surprising, the top 0.1% of earners receives 11% of all 
incomes. In other words, the top 1% of US income 
earners is nearly 20 times as rich as the other 99% 
and the top one tenth of 1% is even more than one 
hundred times richer than the remaining 99.9%. This 
glaring inequality had developed more or less con-
stantly over time and peaked around 2007 but, histo-
rically quite unusually, has not declined much during 
the recent US depression and since 2009.
In distribution terms, Austria is the very opposite of 
the USA. The income distribution of Austrian wage 
earners is one of he most equal anywhere, although 
little is known (typically!) about the relative inco-
mes of the self-employed, particularly in the finan-
cial sector. Consequently, Austrian banks are taxed 
on an uncertain basis. The largest privately owned 
34 Greenspan 2007, 392, note.  
35 The Economist, March 4, 2014, 10. 
11 KIOES Opinions 2 (2014) 
bank, Erste Österreichische AG, happens to be the 
most highly taxed bank in the world, taxed at present 
up to 90% of its net income. In contrast, in the USA 
a highly unequal income distribution and (in this 
depression typical) the strong political favouring of 
banks and "bankers" – as well as the opposite on both 
counts in other countries – go hand in hand, as one 
would surmise when political power goes with the 
banking industry as now in the USA. 
XIII
National income data still substantially underscore 
in particular the economic problems of the USA. 
Even on these terms the USA are now no longer, and 
by a wide margin, the per capita richest nation in the 
world. According to the statistical estimates of The 
Economist's "The World in 2014", the USA with a 
nominal GDP per head of $54.920 and a real one in 
purchasing power terms of the same $54.920, have 
fallen behind Norway with nearly twice their nomi-
nal income. In real PPP terms Norway is also about 
one third richer (GDP per head $103.950, in PPP 
terms $70.250). Second comes Switzerland, mainly 
nominally, but only 2% richer than the USA in real 
terms ($73.070, in PPP terms $55.720). Singapore is 
third, but only in nominal income, its real income 
per head being below the US level (GDP per head 
$55.930, in PPP terms $49.280). Qatar is not given 
in this statistic. Interestingly enough for us Austrians, 
Austria comes fifth on PPP terms, being outdistanced 
by Hong-Kong, but only in real terms (GDP per head 
$42.140, in PPP terms $56.240; Austria $48.260, in 
PPP terms $45.340). Per head of the population, the 
USA are about 12% richer nominally than Austria, 
about 20% in PPP terms. Denmark, Finland (very 
slightly), Sweden, and Canada outdistance Austria 
only in nominal terms, but not in real PPP terms. 
Sweden is next to Austria and only very slightly lo-
wer in PPP terms. 
The most important problem in real national income 
comparisons, however, arises from the international 
national income conventions, which have become 
more and more problematic, and especially so du-
ring the 21st century. (I shall write "national income" 
or "national product" as it should best be measured, 
but actually it is not so because of contrary internati-
onal conventions.) 
By far the greatest problem is actually very little 
known: National income figures are calculated ac-
cording to invoices dispatched by economic agents 
(individuals and firms), not according to bills paid! 
If a bill is not paid within the accounting year, that 
year's GDP should be corrected for this; but one is 
not very sure that statisticians will actually do so. 
Within and between developed economies bills are 
supposed to be paid within three months or half a 
year. But the first (much smaller) problem arises with 
the decay of payments habits: many people no longer 
pay on time, during periods of depressive business, 
as recently. One cannot be sure that the probabilities 
of payment are not overestimated both by the firms 
and by statisticians – in order to let economic deve-
lopments appear rosier than they are. Remember that 
above all national income statistics do not include 
backward corrections once they exceed a period of 
one year. But the real (real in both senses!) problem 
arises with the backward correction of longer-term 
capital values; and in practice this means above all 
sales values of houses bought on credit – credit that 
turns out not to be repaid. In 2003–2007 for the first 
time the USA granted both much too easy credit 
terms, crediting up to 100% of purchase prices (in-
cluding sales fees); and above all credits were granted 
for highly dubious purchases. Therefore, as I quoted 
in section VIII, Greenspan estimated that uncollec-
tible real estate debts in the USA were up to $17 "tril-
lion" or about 120% of GDP; and if all that was not 
accounted for in GDP calculation it would mean that 
for the entire first decade of the 21st century US GDP 
was overestimated by some 8% a year. If we take only 
about 60% of this estimation of Greenspan's as an ac-
tually realised loss and then lower the figure to about 
80% of it for what might have found its way into GDP 
statistics, this would still amount to a loss of about 
4% a year. In consequence, already this one correction 
would reduce the at best 2.5% annual growth rate of 
US national income to actually –1.5% (by another 
calculation even to –5%) for every year in that first 
decade, turning the USA into a steadily shrinking 
economy.
A second correction must be made for US national 
income accounting only, though not for the usual 
international statistics for the USA: Against binding 
international, i.e. UN, statistical conventions the 
USA calculate their "national income" not according 
to gross domestic product values but according to 
gross national product values: They leave out (igno-
re) – above all – all increasing running foreign US 
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debts. Even in GDP terms, The Economist estimates36 
US GDP growth at +2.6%, too optimistically I think. 
As debts increase in the USA by 2.4% annually accor-
ding to these Economist statistics, that would mean 
that at present the USA achieve something like zero 
income growth as soon as one subtracts the increa-
sing debts. Or at best a net growth rate of a meagre 
0.6% if one relies on The Economist of March 8, 2014, 
which quotes a present 2.8% growth rate and a –2.2% 
current account balance (i.e. increasing debts). In 
most years of the 21st century increasing debt meant 
that even without a crisis the USA had a net income 
growth of only –0.5 or even –1.0% a year. And this 
would still have to be corrected, as before, for unpaid 
bills.
Much more important is a third correction, now of 
"gross national product" more appropriately calcula-
ted: The world suffers damages due to storms, floods, 
droughts, etc. This type of damages has obviously in-
creased of late, due to climate change. As yet, such 
damages have never been subtracted from social 
product, while activities of repairing the damages are 
added to it. Realistically, on capital account we would 
have to subtract the damages and the increasingly 
larger losses due to them.
We might include the above named damages under 
environmental ones in a wider sense or we could 
consider environmental damages as a separate fourth 
category. Humans consume more and more irrepla-
ceable environmental assets and pollute their envi-
ronment. The negative effects of these activities are 
not taken into account in GDP calculations. What 
is taken into account are the costs of e.g. cleaning 
up environmental pollution. If – this would be the 
fourth correction needed – in the first place the ne-
gative effects were taken into account such envi-
ronmental damages – increasing over time, to boot 
– would substantially lower actual income gains, often 
to zero and below.
The most important difficulty, the fifth and final one 
in our survey, is that national income statistics are 
calculated on the assumption that relative prices of 
the various items stay constant over time. But what 
if important items, especially those with low price 
elasticities, i.e. items not easily substituted, steadily 
rise in price? Such a rise in supply price will be typi-
cal for items that become scarcer due to their partial 
36 "The World in 2014", p.97.
exhaustion or to increasing limitations of their phy-
sical supply conditions worldwide. This is the prob-
lem that has – unfortunately – been overdramatized 
by environmentalists, who see world supply as easily 
exhaustible, while economists have pointed out on 
the one hand the usual economic remedy of finding 
substitutes and, on the other hand, the demand-re-
ducing effect of rising prices, i.e. the price elasticity 
of demand.
But what if there are no substitutes and price elastici-
ty of demand is also very low in absolute terms? This 
is the case for two central categories of consumption: 
food and energy, including transportation cost. Ac-
cording to The Economist 37 the dollar index for food 
prices with 2005 = 100 is now at 200.1, in other words: 
food costs have doubled (!) over the last eight years. 
And the West Texas Intermediate price of a barrel of 
oil is now $103.2, up from only $11 about fifteen or 
twenty years ago: it has increased nine-fold. If the 
increase of food prices since 2005 were to continue 
unabated, food prices around 2050 – at the expected 
peak of world population – would be about 40 times 
higher than now. For Austria, where the food share 
of average income consumption is about 12.5% at 
present, this share could easily rise to 37.5% of nati-
onal income. Energy prices will continue to rise, but 
are impossible to calculate or predict. But it is not un-
realistic to assume that the energy share of national 
income will at least double. Not very much would be 
left for other consumption then. We are clearly hea-
ding towards real impoverishment in the developed 
world, not towards real income growth, as optimists 
would have it. About 2005 the developed economies 
had reached the maximum of real income per capita; 
we are already on a long-run downward path.
XIV
I started out this paper as both a theoretical and also 
practically active economist, both with a mean and 
a variance perspective, both with a view of singling 
out the first and singling out the second moment of 
empirical probability distributions: as one who needs 
the viewpoint of the theoretical economist and also 
that of the practising statistician. As to probability 
distributions assumed one has to think especially of 
changing probability distributions, changing both in 
their means and in their variances. Apart from God 
there is nothing absolute in this world, everything is 
37 The Economist, March 4, 2014, p.77.
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in principle relative and (above all as a didactic sim-
plification) true only for a short time. I have been a 
moderate Keynesian and a moderate Free Market 
economist, of late usually, but wrongly, called a neo-
classical one. But I have changed my viewpoint often, 
and rightly so. In 2011, Nicholas Wapshott, a journal-
ist, published a book Keynes – Hayek: The Clash that 
defined Modern Economics.38 Apart from the ques-
tions "Which Keynes?" and "Which Hayek?" both of 
these giants of economic thought were quite variable 
and not always in conflict. But one has to ask: Are 
these two authors of modern economics? Keynes 
died in 1946, i.e. close to seventy years ago, while 
Hayek died at a ripe old age in 1992.39 Both were the-
orists of closed economies, and those are largely ir-
relevant nowadays for a globally integrated economy, 
especially one like Austria where the export share in 
gross national product is some 56 or 57%. Keynes' ba-
sic idea was that highly variable and uncertain short-
run economic expectations matter greatly, which is 
true for financial markets – and those were one of 
his main subjects. This is relevant in highly uncer-
tain periods of recessionary or depressive economies 
as once more in recent, but already outdated periods. 
Hayek mainly thought of collective expectations for-
mation centred on innovation, of collective expecta-
tions when general economic development is not too 
uncertain. So their views are complementary rather 
than fully contradictory and may be used either al-
ternatively over time or even along each other. But 
apart from the difficulty of international determina-
tion the real problem with their views is their use 
with the heterogeneity of so many different groups 
of economic actors. How can we use such simplified 
models of one or two groups for the clash between 
various types of Republicans and even more various 
types of Democrats in the present-day USA, or for 
the dominance of pensioners of 64 to 50 years of age 
and younger (!) as in Austria?
Once more, I return to The Economist, this time to a 
recent review of a book by Eswar Prasad, The Dollar 
Trap. Prasad asserts that the dollar's position is "sub-
optimal but stable and self-reinforcing". The urgent 
question is what will happen to this highly unstable 
dollar in the longer run. The position of the dollar's 
counterpart, the yuan, is much clearer, but often 
38 Nicholas Wapshott, Keynes Hayek – The Clash That Defined 
Modern Economics. New York – London 2011.
39 See Erich W.Streissler, "Hayek on Information and Socialism", 
Wirtschaftspolitische Blätter 1992/2, 258-283.
forgotten: "The yuan has appreciated by about 35% 
against the dollar since mid-2005". The really inter-
esting point of Prasad's seems to be that the strength 
of the dollar is in a sense a self-contradictory notion: 
International economic agents tend to hold dollars, 
in spite of making constant losses in them, because 
they can use the dollar as a hedge in especially strong 
crises: "The dollar has no long-term tendency to 
strengthen … the dollar tends to strengthen in times 
of crisis … in times of stress, the appeal of a dollar 
asset is that it always holds its value against a dollar 
debt. The dollar is a global hegemon partly because it 
is also a global hedge."40   
Such a book is a novelty and relevant for financial 
market actors. The real problems arise between con-
tradictory situations of the present and of the future, 
contradictory aims of those who hold both financial 
asset and financial debt positions in the same cur-
rency, and the contradictory developments of the 
real and the financial economy. This makes recurring 
analysis of quantitative economic development a ne-
cessity, an ever topical challenge requiring an open, 
unbiased, and, dare I say it, youthful mind. In many 
ways our present problems are so new and also defy 
any kind of easily simplified homogenous view that 
we are forced to use a kind of theoretically informed 
historicism to come to terms with the challenges of 
our unordered economic world.41 
40 The Economist, March 4, 2014, 65: review of Eswar S.Prasad, 
The Dollar Trap: How the U.S.Dollar Tightened Its Grip On 
Global Finance. 2013. Quotations taken from the review.
41 For an early evaluation along these lines see already Robert 
A. Mundell, "A Reconsideration of the Twentieth Century", 
Nobel Lecture, American Economic  Review, 90/3, 2000, 
327–340.
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